Kokoda Track Campaign The Kokoda Track itself is single-file track starting just outside Port Moresby on the Coral Sea and (depending on definition) runs 60–100 kilometres through the Owen Stanley Ranges to Kokoda and the coastal lowlands beyond by the Solomon Sea. The track crosses some of the most rugged and isolated terrain in the world, reaches 2,250 metres at Mount Bellamy, and combines hot humid days with intensely cold nights, torrential rainfall and endemic tropical diseases such as malaria. The track is passable only on foot, this had extreme repercussions for logistics, the size of forces and the type of warfare conducted on the Track.
Looking for ways to counter the Japanese advance
into the South Pacific, the Supreme Allied Commander in the South West Pacific
Area, General Douglas MacArthur, decided to build up Allied forces in New
Guinea as a prelude to an offensive against the main Japanese base at Rabaul.
Lieutenant-General Sydney Rowell, the commander of the Allied armies' New
Guinea Force, ordered the 100-strong B company of the Australian 39th (Militia)
Battalion, to travel overland along the Track to the village of Kokoda.
Once there, B Company was to secure the airstrip at Kokoda, in preparation
for an Allied build-up along the Papuan north coast. As the militia company
was securing its positions, news reached them of Japanese landings on the
north coast of New Guinea. Having established the strength of the defending
forces, and with the strategically vital supply base and airstrip at Kokoda
within his grasp, Tsukamoto deemed the track to be practicable for a full
scale overland assault against Port Moresby. The Imperial Japanese Army's
10,000-strong South Seas Force, commanded by Major-General Tomitaro Horii,
based at Rabaul, was tasked with the capture of Port Moresby. Horii's force
landed at the Papuan beachheads and began moving up the Track. Belatedly, MacArthur and the Allied land commander
(and Australian Commander-in-Chief), General Thomas Blamey, realized the
seriousness of the situation and ordered the Australian 7th Division to
embark from Australia for New Guinea. The 21st Brigade was the first to
arrive at Port Moresby — commanded by Brigadier Arnold Potts it comprised
the 2/14th Battalion, 2/16th Battalion and the 2/27th Battalion. The 2/14th
and 2/16th immediately began moving north along the Track to reinforce Maroubra
Force. The 2/27th Battalion was tasked for the Kokoda Track but following
the Japanese landings at Milne Bay, the 2/27th was held in Port Moresby
as the divisional reserve.
Japanese reconnaisance had revealed a parallel track bypassing Isurava, defended by the Australian 53rd Battalion. A Japanese battalion was sent to force this route open and met with success as the demoralized 53rd gave ground retreating to the Track junction behind to Isurava. Many senior officers of the 53rd were killed, leading to further demoralization in the battalion. During the battle, the first troops of the 21st Brigade arrived to reinforce the 39th Battalion. Potts took command of Maroubra Force, and using the screen provided by the 39th Battalion, deployed the 2/14th Battalion at Isurava and sending the 2/16th Battalion to take over defence of the alternate track from the retreating 53rd Battalion. By the time the 2/14th Battalion had deployed, the Japanese were still able to field a force some 5,000 strong and therefore outnumbered the Australians by at least five-to-one. Japanese tactics were little changed from the campaign through Malaya — pin the enemy in place with suicidal frontal attacks while feeling for the flanks with a view to cutting off enemy forces from the rear. However, Horii was on a strict timetable, any delays feeling for flanks meant the gradual debilitation of his force from disease and starvation. As a result, Maroubra Force endured four days of violent frontal attacks. During the fighting, the 39th Battalion was forced to stay on instead of being relieved as the Japanese threatened several times to break through the 2/14ths perimeter. On August 29, Private Bruce Kingsbury of the 2/14th made a unique individual contribution to the campaign, and was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross as a result. His citation read, in part: Private Kingsbury, who was one of the few survivors
of a platoon which had been overrun ... immediately volunteered to join
a different platoon which had been ordered to counterattack. He rushed
forward firing the Bren gun from his hip through terrific machine-gun
fire and succeeded in clearing a path through the enemy. Continuing to
sweep enemy positions with his fire and inflicting an extremely high number
of casualties on them, Private Kingsbury was then seen to fallto the ground
shot dead by the bullet from a sniper hiding in the wood. However, Australian casualties mounted and ammunition ran low. The Japanese threatened to make a breakthrough on the alternate track and Horii had now deployed several companies on the flanks and near the rear of the 2/14th and 39th Battalions, threatening an encirclement. Outnumbered, Maroubra Force withdrew towards Nauro and Menari. Potts relieved the exhausted 39th Battalion and the shattered 49th and 53rd; the malaria-wracked survivors making their way back to Port Moresby on foot or carried by Papuan stretcher parties.
No suitable defensive terrain existed between Isurava and a feature known as Mission Ridge which was south of Nauro and Myola. As a result, Brigadier Potts and Maroubra force retreated back through Menari mounting small delaying actions where possible. Myola to that time had been used as a supply dump, a cleared patch of ground allowing supply drops by the U.S. Army Air Force Douglas DC-3 "biscuit bombers". Allen, commanding the 7th Division, asked Potts when offensive actions would be resumed now that air-drops were ensuring a regular if sparse and intermittent flow of supplies. Potts in turn enquired after his 2/27th Battalion, denied him by Allen in view of the situation at Milne Bay. Pressured by Rowell and Blamey, Allen ordered Potts to hold Myola as a forward supply base and gather sufficient supplies for an offensive against the Japanese advance. Allen's orders were stunningly ignorant of the true situation facing Maroubra Force, but Potts knew only too well the overwhelming superiority of numbers fielded against him. Threatened with an outflanking maneuver through a loop of the Track and insufficient terrain near Myola suitable for a set-piece defence, Potts was forced to retreat through Myola, destroying the supply base behind him.
Taking up positions on a hilltop straddling the Track which later became known as "Brigade Hill", Maroubra Force awaited the Japanese advance. The usual Japanese frontal attacks began soon after upon the Australian leading elements. However, the Japanese launched a strong flank attack aimed at cutting off the lead elements from the rest of Maroubra Force. The flank attack cut Maroubra Force in two, separating the brigade headquarters staff from the three battalions. With Brigade HQ about to be overrun, Brigadier Potts and the rear elements of Maroubra Force were forced to retreat back along the Track to the village of Menari. When it became clear that they were in danger of being cut-off and destroyed, the remaining soldiers of all three Australian battalions immediately left the Track and "went bush" via an alternate track to the village of Menari. The 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions managed to re-unite with Brigadier Potts and 21st Brigade headquarters at Menari, but the 2/27th Battalion was unable to reach Menari before the rest of the brigade was again forced to retreat by the advancing Japanese. The 2/27th along with wounded from the other battalions were forced to follow paths parallel to the main Track, eventually making their way back to Ioribaiwa and thence to Imita Ridge. Elements of the 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions accompanying Potts later managed to regroup for the defence of Imita Ridge but the 2/27th only managed to regroup much later after the Japanese retreat began. Controversy surrounds some of reports of the actions taken by the three Australian battalions and their commanders, but the end result of the action was the shattering of Maroubra Force. The defeat of the 21st Brigade at Brigade Hill finally ended Maroubra Force's defence of the Kokoda Track as a cohesive unit and was a decisive victory for the Japanese. The defeat was one of many factors leading later to the "running rabbits" incident at base camp at Koitaki. General Thomas Blamey ordered Brigadier Potts to
immediately report to Port Moresby "for consultations", replacing
him as Maroubra Force commander with Brigadier Selwyn Porter. Meanwhile, the worn-out soldiers of Maroubra Force were relieved by the 25th Brigade commanded by Brigadier Ken Eather and the 16th Brigade (of the Australian 6th Division) commanded by Brigadier John Lloyd. The Australian brigades dug in at Imita Ridge, near the start of the Kokoda Track outside Port Moresby and were supported by a artillery battery of 25 pounders which had been forcibly brought up the Track. At this time, Major-General Horii received orders
from the Japanese commander at Rabaul - due to the ongoing commitments of
the Battle of Guadalcanal, no more reinforcements could be spared for the
Kokoda Track offensive and General Horii was to withdraw to the Buna-Gona
beachheads. The order to withdraw was given and the Japanese began to rapidly
move back towards Kokoda. Several grisly discoveries by advancing Australian troops starkly illustrated the logistical nightmare of the Track — Japanese corpses were often found with no sign of external trauma having died from typhoid and dysentery, and several corpses of Australian soldiers were found to have had body parts removed, a result of the starving Japanese resorting to cannibalism. In order to try to cut off the Japanese at the Kumusi River crossings, the United States 126th Regiment of the 32nd Divison set off on an advance from Port Moresby along tracks parallel to the Kokoda Track. However the Japanese withdrawal was more rapid than expected, and the 126th Regiment emerged near the Gona-Buna beachheads without encountering the Japanese. Unfortunately tropical diseases and exhaustion took their toll on the 126th which lost a significant part of its strength for the subsequent Battle of Buna-Gona. In a dramatic and bizarre turn of events, Major-General
Horii disappeared presumed drowned while withdrawing with his troops across
the Kumusi River, towards the beachheads. The fierce current of the river
swept away a horse on which he was riding; instead Horii opted to float
down the Kumusi River in a canoe with other senior officers in order to
quickly get back to Buna and organize the beachhead defences. The canoe
was floated down to the river mouth, but Horii and his staff were swept
out to sea in a freak squall. None were ever seen again. The Japanese withdrew within their formidable defences around the Buna-Gona beachheads, reinforced by fresh Japanese units from Rabaul. A joint Australian-United States Army operation was launched to crush the Japanese beachheads, in the Battle of Buna-Gona. Following the conclusion of the action at Buna and Gona, about 30 remaining members of the 39th Infantry Battalion were airlifted out of the front line and the battalion was dissolved, to the regret of some members. Allied operations against Japanese forces in New Guinea continued into 1945. Japanese War Crimes As the Japanese withdrew the Australian soldiers were confronted with evidence of cannibalism. Dead and wounded soldiers who had been left behind in the Australian retreat from Templton Crossing were stripped of flesh. Upon returning during their advance and the Japanese retreat, Australian soldiers saw the evidence of the cannibalism in various locations. Soldiers testified that the Japanese had not run short of rations having uncovered rice dumps and significant amounts of tinned food. The Japanese were also responsible for the execution of three nuns and a priest shortly after their arrival on the island.[13] Significance While the Gallipoli Campaign of World War I was Australia's first military test as a new nation, the Kokoda and subsequent New Guinea Campaign was the first time that Australia's security had been threatened directly. Given that at the time, Papua New Guinea was an Australian Protectorate, Kokoda saw Australians fight and die repelling an invader on Australian soil, without the material presence or support of the United Kingdom. The Kokoda Track campaign was hampered by the senior military commanders lacking knowledge of the Papuan environment. Both MacArthur and Blamey were unaware of the appalling terrain and the extreme conditions in which the battles were fought. Orders given to the commanders on the ground were sometimes unrealistic given the conditions on the ground. In the end though, their strategy of fighting the enemy in Papua - widely criticised at the time - was proven sound. The Kokoda Track campaign highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the individual soldiers and the lower level commanders. The US and Australian Armies would take steps to improve individual and unit training. Logistical infrastructure would be greatly improved. The 39th Infantry Battalion became famous. Ralph Honner summed up the perceived magnitude of his Battalion's achievement when he described the Battle of Isurava as "Australia's Thermopylae". Notes 1. Pérusse, Yvon (July 1993). Bushwalking
in Papua New Guinea, 2, Lonely Planet, p. 98. ISBN 0-86442-052-8. References * Brune, Peter (2003). A Bastard of a Place : The
Australians in Papua. Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-74114-403-5. |